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QUINTESSENTIAL ELEMENTS OF MEANINGFUL
CONSTITUTIONS IN POST-CONFLICT STATES
WILLIAM W. VAN ALSTYNE*
quintessence, n. In ancient and medieval philosophy, the fifth
and highest essence after the four elements of earth, air, fire,
and water, thought to be the substance of heavenly bodies and
latent in all things.1
INTRODUCTION
The overall topic of this symposium is "Constitutional Drafting
in Post-Conflict States." Given the extent to which there has been
such a seismic shake up of various states within the past two
decades, the subject for our consideration would seem to be
exquisitely timely. Given the uncertainty of what may yet emerge
from the internecine violence still raging in places such as Iraq in
the brutalizing aftermath of the dismantled Saddam Hussein
regime, or from the ongoing strife even now still savaging Somalia,
the broken state of Congo, or Robert Mugabe's cruel regime in
Zimbabwe and the apparently kleptocratic government in Nigeria,
however, one may well insist that our symposium may also be
somewhat premature. Although one would surely want to be of
"constitutional drafting" help, quite obviously none of these states
are, as yet, genuinely post-conflict states. Accordingly, it is surely
hard to speak with any confidence on the kind of constitutions one
might most sensibly consider with conditions such as they are in
these chaotic states.
Leaving these places to one side (on the understanding that none
of these places possesses sufficient stability to fit the definition of
a post-conflict state to qualify for anything beyond the most
* Lee Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law.
1. AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 1937 (4th ed. 2000).
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minimum suggestions2), on the other hand, even if one widens one's
view to take in the dissolution of the former Soviet Union, from
which nearly all of its fifteen formerly integrated "republics" exited
since 1989, or widens it again to include the five states newly
formed from former Yugoslavia, or the two from the cleaving of
Czechoslovakia into Czech and Slovak national states in 1993-to
name just some few new "post-conflict" states-it is still not obvious
what one's own best intuitions can usefully yield regarding the sorts
of things suitable to be inscribed in the constitutions of such
recently sundered places as these. Most of these newly born (or
reborn) states have already settled such questions for themselves,
whether for the better or otherwise. Whether that is wholly true, it
is in any event far from obvious how rank outsiders, remote from
the local circumstances of each of these places, can be of responsible
service in providing advice. Moreover, it is a task from which I
might well be personally excused in any event, mindful both of the
chastening observations Mark Tushnet provides in his separate
article in this symposium cautioning one against undue pontificat-
ing on matters such as these outside one's normal range,4 as well as
mindful of the superior credentials possessed by scholars such as
Donald Horowitz (whose own contribution also appears in this
symposium'), which qualify them to speak with an authority I
cannot claim.
Even so, allowing for all of this, granted that one should be aware
of one's limitations, and granted also that one ought to be very wary
of overgeneralizing,6 perhaps it is nonetheless possible that some
2. Though even now, some able scholars have managed to give sobering thought in
respect to some of these still chaotic states; for example, see the insightful suggestions
offered by Donald Horowitz on reconstituting Iraq in Jacob Dagger, Reinventing Iraq, DUKE
MAG., July-Aug. 2007, at 30-31 (interviewing Donald Horowitz); Unifying Iraq, WALL ST. J.,
June 19, 2007, at A16.
3. See Peter Murrell, How Far Has the Transition Progressed? 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 25,
25-26 (1996).
4. See Mark Tushnet, Some Skepticism About Normative Constitutional Advice, 49 WM.
& MARY L. REv. 1473 (2008).
5. Donald L. Horowitz, Conciliatory Institutions and Constitutional Processes in Post-
Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1213 (2008); see also DONALD L. HOROWITZ, ETHNIC
GROUPS IN CONFLICT (2000); Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Conflict Management for Policy
Makers, in CONFLICTAND PEACEMAKING INMULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES 115 (Joseph V. Montville
ed., 1990).
6. One might "overgeneralize" by presuming to suggest, for example, whether a federal
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brief canvassing of constitutions in other "post-conflict states,"
including our own, may nevertheless yield some useful observations
to share. In just this last regard, lest the oldest of all of these
(namely, our own Constitution) be prematurely put to one side as
highly unlikely to be useful in these discussions in thinking about
today's world, still, it is useful to note, if just in passing, that it
happens to fit squarely within the qualifying description of a "post-
conflict" constitution, i.e., a constitution drawn up in the aftermath
of revolution and war. In other words, like a large number of other
"post-conflict" documents of much more recent times-such as the
Constitution of the Soviet Union with its own first "post-conflict"
constitutional order is more likely to function "better" than one describing a unitary national
state. Note, merely as a first step in considering the question, that the question may itself
make little sense if one is thinking about small, relatively homogeneous compact states of
hardly more than postage-stamp size-for example, Liechtenstein, Monaco, San Marino,
Dubai, or Singapore-albeit one might think it to be a more challenging question in the
circumstances, say, of Iraq, of China, or, for that matter, of either Canada or the United
States itself. But note that even then-i.e., even assuming it may be important to consider
whether, in the circumstances one is addressing, that a "federal" republic (rather than a
"national" republic) may make better constitutional sense-it is not always easy to measure
which kinds of legislative powers may be "best" vested in the national government and which
other kinds may be better left to pluralistic determinations of the constituent states (however
they may be formed). One may think the answers to be obvious, but consider, for example,
that while laws respecting "marriage" and "divorce" are determined state by state within the
United States, in closely neighboring Canada-itself emphatically a very strong "federalism"
model of constitutional government in many significant respects-it is exclusively the
national government-not the provincial governments-that is empowered by its constitution
to provide the laws declaring who may marry and who may not. See The British North
America Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. ch. 3 (U.K.), as reprinted in R.S.C., No. 5, pt. VI, § 91
(Appendix 1985). Thus, as it happens, the Canadian "federalism" rule on this particular
matter is the very opposite of the "federalism" rule that prevails in the United States.
So, to come more quickly to the point of this extended footnote, what does one make of this
in a more general way? Which approach-the Canadian or the American-seems more
consistent overall with "federalism?" Perhaps, in that respect, the American approach can
claim the higher ground. On the other hand, putting that question aside (i.e., greater
consistency with "federalism" as such), which rule-the American or the Canadian
-commends itself as the "better" rule as such? In the United States, for example, given
things as they are, would one welcome an amendment to the Constitution empowering
Congress to establish "the law" on this subject such that nothing other than what the
national government itself declared to be a "suitable" marriage--or a "suitable" divorce-
could have any legal standing in any state? If so, just why would one consider that to be
desirable? (But then, on the other hand, if not, then why not?) Whatever one's own views on
these particular questions, the point here is that it is questions of just this endlessly
contestable kind that caution one to think carefully about the implications of what one
proposes to put into a constitution-to do so even in "federal" states, and most especially so
in offering advice for drafting constitutions for people and places one hardly knows.
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version in 1918, carried through three subsequent editions until the
national collapse in 1989,7 or that of the People's Republic of China
(1982),3 or that of postwar Germany (1949), 9 or that of postwar
Japan (1946)' 0 -our own more aged Constitution is itself very much
a "post-conflict" document, such as it is. To be sure, it was negoti-
ated with far fewer preexisting models from which to draw in
working out its design than now exist." Even so, even allowing for
all of that, are there any lessons to be learned here? I think there
are, at least a few.
I.
Its first enacted version, the original constitution (The Articles of
Confederation (1781)), insisted in its very Preamble that what the
thirteen "post-conflict" states sought in its promulgation was not
some merely loose relationship. Much less was it claimed to be a
relationship of a merely provisional or temporary sort. To the
contrary, the Preamble pointedly declared that these Articles meant
to provide for a "Perpetual Union," thereafter to be known (even as
it still is) as "The United States of America." 2 That document-our
own original, written, post-conflict constitution-was never even
7. See ROBERT SHARLET, SOVIET CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS: FROM DE-STALINIZATION TO
DISINTEGRATION 9-10 (1992).
8. See ALBERT HUNG-YEE CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 44-45 (1998).
9. See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 10
(1994).
10. See GLENN D. HOOK & GAVAN MCCORMACK, JAPAN'S CONTESTED CONSTITUTION 4
(2001).
11. So, for example, the English had no formal written constitution at all at the time. See
generally David Jenkins, From Unwritten to Written: Transformation in the British Common.
Law Constitution, 36 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 863 (2003). Indeed, the Constitution of the
United States is the oldest, extant written constitution in the world, the next oldest being
that of Norway, from 1814. See Lawrence Watters, Indigenous Peoples and the Environment:
Convergence from a Nordic Perspective, 20 UCLA J. ENVTL. L. & POLY 237, 288 (2001-02).
The second half of the twentieth century wrought a revolution in written constitutions, which
have become a commonplace feature of nearly every national state. New Zealand and Israel,
as well as the United Kingdom itself, provide the rare exceptions among modern states in
having no written constitution even today, a point to which I shall return at the close of this
Article.
12. See ROBERTW. HOFFERT, A PoLITIcs OFTENSIONS: THEARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION
AND AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEAS 199 (1992).
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once amended.13 But, as we know, on the other hand, neither did it
last. Rather, despite its vaunted claim of providing an enduring
charter of perpetual union, the Articles began nearly at once to fall
apart and indeed were abandoned quite unceremoniously in a
practical manner of speaking, to be succeeded by the provisions of
the Constitution drafted de novo in a single sweltering Philadelphia
summer session in 1787, in a successor document declaring itself to
be the new supreme law (in lieu of the original Articles of perpetual
union), once conventions in even a mere nine states might meet and
ratify its various provisions, as, indeed, occurred within the very
next year. 14
But even with this second beginning as it was-a second
beginning further fortified nearly at once by certain, critically added
amendments that were proposed by the First Congress to assemble
under its auspices in 1789 (followed promptly by ample state
ratifications sufficient to install nearly all of them-ten of twelve
-into the Constitution), the newer and far grander edifice nonethe-
less also came within a hair's breadth of crashing to pieces within
13. Nor, as a practical matter, was there any great likelihood that it could it have been.
Its amendment provision (Article XIII) required unanimity of state approval for any change,
no matter how slight. See id. at 206. There was essentially no real chance that the unanimity
requirement could be met at the time; for example, Rhode Island declined even to send
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, even to consider amendments to the Articles of
Confederation, and-having spurned the Philadelphia Convention-Rhode Island likewise
declined to ratify the new Constitution until it was literally left by itself. See ALFRED H.
KELLY & WINFRED A. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND
DEVELOPMENT 115, 159-60 (1948).
14. To be sure, however, as a practical matter, had Virginia and New York conventions
not promptly also added their resolutions of ratification (thus making these two large,
economically important, critically located states the tenth and eleventh states to approve the
Constitution), it is most unlikely that the new, more carefully drafted Constitution of
1787-despite its vaunted claim of providing a "more perfect Union"(i.e., "more perfect" than
the merely "perpetual union" provided by the Articles of Confederation)-would have
succeeded, rather than nearly at once falling apart. See WILLIAM H. RIKER, THE STRATEGY
OF RHETORIC: CAMPAIGNING FOR THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 220, 229 (1996).
There is one additional, albeit minor, note in this regard: Although conventions in eleven
states (all of the original thirteen formerly joined under the Articles of Confederation except
North Carolina and Rhode Island) had fully ratified the Constitution as of mid-1788, even
then the Constitution did not take effect even within these states until the following year
when, in March of 1789, the first Congress formally assembled under its auspices, even as
the old government was dissolved. See, for elaboration, the opinion by Chief Justice John
Marshall, for a unanimous Supreme Court, in Owings v. Speed, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420
(1820).
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mere decades of its own original entrenchment. The irony of the
event-and the lessons to be learned from it-are perhaps all the
more instructive, moreover, insofar as the defects contributing to
the crash this time around were quite the opposite of the kind of
defects accounting for the problems that had beset the first
installment of the Constitution (the Articles of Confederation). That
is, they were not the consequence of what had been left out by way
of adequate provision to establish the nation but instead, the
consequence of what had expressly been put in.
Those expressly included provisions are far too well known to
require review in extended comment here, but, briefly, they were
those that effectively tipped the scales of national power, commit-
ting disproportionate control of national political power and of
national policy into the hands of states with slavery on their
minds,15 as well as other provisions that substantially aided and
abetted the institution itself,'6 albeit in shrouded locutions (not
using words such as "slavery" or "slaves")-clauses effectively
15. These states included, for example, those with large slave populations (states such
as Virginia itself, where slaves were first landed at Jamestown in 1619, the number
gradually growing and the state laws gradually adjusted in increasingly harsh fashion such
that, by 1789, roughly as many persons were held in conditions of regulated chattel slavery
in Virginia as equaled the whole of its free population). See generally THAD W. TATE, THE
NEGRO IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY WILLIAMSBURG (1965). Tate provides additional references
in a useful bibliography. Id. at 237-46. All of these states were constitutionally
"accommodated" by guaranteeing each state proportionately greater representation in the
House of Representatives-and likewise a greater share of presidential electors as well-than
these states (essentially six of the original thirteen) would otherwise have had, but for the
compromises etched into provisions made in Article I, Section 2 (the "three fifths of all other
Persons" counting provision, which carries its effect into Article II, allocating presidential
electors guaranteed to each state corresponding to the number of representatives it is
guaranteed under the allocation formula in Article I, Section 2). See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2,
cl. 3; id. art. II, § 1, cl. 2.
16. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1 (indicating that "[tihe Migration or Importation
of such Persons [meaning the importation of slaves] as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to [1808]," thus providing
states a twenty-year "safe harbor" to continue importing slaves); id. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No
Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or
Labor, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may
be due."); id. art. V (providing for amendments, including a special provision forbidding any
amendment to the Constitution prior to 1808 that would affect the twenty-year "safe harbor"
guarantee in Article I, Section 9, Clause 1); see also Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.)
393 (1856).
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abandoned only with forcible enactment of a trilogy of amendments:
the 13th in 1865, the 14th in 1868, and the 15th in 1870, following
an horrendous Civil War (1860-1865). All of this being so and
looking back on all of this in a mere flash, it is certainly accurate
to describe "The" Constitution of the United States as a telling
example of "constitution drafting in a 'post-conflict state"' 17 and
perhaps, therefore, also itself a study that may provide some insight
into the pitfalls one is likely to encounter in drafting constitutions
in each of two critical respects: what may be important to put into
them 8 and equally, on the other hand, what may be just as
important not to include. 19
17. It is surely such an example. Indeed, it is probably more accurate to identify it as a
"two 'post-conflict"' constitution. It is a constitution forged from two violent conflicts-the
first that was provisionally settled in 1781, in Yorktown (with Cornwallis's surrender, after
which the English sought a negotiated peace), and the second in 1865 (with Lee's surrender
of the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House, effectively concluding four
years of America's bloodiest war-a war consummated with more than one million casualties
and more than 600,000 deaths-succeeded by that particular trilogy of amendments that
fundamentally remade the Constitution still again). For an excellent recent review of these
transforming events, see GARRETT EPPS, DEMOCRACY REBORN (2006).
18. For example, it may be important to put in a sufficient amplitude of described
national substantive power to sustain a commanding national government, both domestically
and in respect to foreign affairs (assuredly the missing ingredient from and crippling
weakness of the original Articles of Confederation); perhaps, too, some prescribed separations
in kinds of power (horizgntally as well as vertically) as may be found in many well-ordered
states, including our own; and perhaps, also, not least importantly, some reasonably clear
iteration of "rights" or "freedoms" that the government may not merely expediently trade
away or presume simply to ignore.
19. For example, it may be important not to include such concessions (whether to favored
groups, or regions, or states) as may seem merely necessary to secure adequate consensus
if there is to be any realistic prospect to put any proposed "post-conflict" constitution into
legal effect in the first place, but concessions one has reason to know may also merely
temporize-and thus merely postpone-another "reckoning" which, altogether foreseeably,
may come with a dreadful likelihood, as it most assuredly did in the "United" States.
Here, again, another reference to Canada may be useful in passing, this time by way of
furnishing examples of"special" accommodations of a partisan sort, though none as gross and
disfigured as our own Constitution of 1789. In one of several provisions intended to persuade
Quebec not to withhold its endorsement (which Quebec has even yet not provided despite
various failed efforts to appease it), the provision providing for its national Supreme Court
expressly requires that three of nine justices come from Quebec. Supreme Court Act, R.S.C.,
ch. S-26, S. 6 (2007), available at http://laws.justice.gc.ca/en (search 'Title" for "Supreme
Court Act"). No similar accommodation is made for any other province (i.e., no other province
or combination of provinces is similarly guaranteed some designated "portion" or
"representation" on the nation's highest court).
Additionally, here is a different kind of example, also from Canada, one potentially far
more consequential in kind: To allay concerns that various provisions in its Charter of Rights
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II.
"Constitution drafting" is also merely the art of the possible,
however, and perhaps never more so than when undertaken in the
immediate aftermath of great crises characteristic of post-conflict
states. And it will sometimes be obvious that, despite one's well-
founded misgivings respecting the kinds of things we have just now
reviewed, in order to construct (or reconstruct) a constitution with
provisions minimally satisfactory to all parties without whose
willingness to subscribe to it in the fractious circumstances of its
proposal the enterprise itself may be doomed, there will be "accom-
modations" believed to be essential to make, and they probably will
include a number of merely concessionary clauses-clauses that
ought not have been necessary but nonetheless seemed to be
required and so become an encysted part of the resulting document,
such as it was.
Even so, contingent on one other consideration, namely, what the
document provides respecting how, by whom, when, and in what
degree those provisions-or any other provisions-may be subse-
quently altered in due course, this consideration may appropriately
weigh less heavily in judging the document as a whole. The "trick"
here, quite obviously, is how to find the proper balance, such that
subsequent constitutional alteration (whether minor or major) is
made neither so easy on the one hand, that, like the Constitution of
California,2 ° its provisions may be just readily put at risk by simple
and Freedoms (equivalent to the entrenched Bill of Rights in the United States) might, in the
hands of the judiciary, prove to be too risky, the Charter itself expressly allows the national
Parliament and each provincial legislature simply to "opt out" of being bound by any of a
designated number of the listed guarantees. Part I, Sec. 33 of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.). That is, they may simply declare
that, in respect to a particular law, it may not be called into question under particular
Charter sections, and if they do so declare, then that is that!
20. See CAL. CONST. art. XVIII, § 4 (providing for amendment by simple majority vote in
statewide referendum). Is it suitable to refer to California in this context, given that it is
merely a state within the United States, and not in any sense a "nation?" But surely it may
be. The population of California today (roughly 36 million) is by itself virtually ten times
greater than that of all thirteen states combined when the Constitution was drafted and put
into effect (and much larger, too, for that matter, than that of many modern nation states).
Compare U.S. Census Bureau, California, http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/06000.html
(last visited Feb. 21, 2008), with U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION, HOUSING UNITS, AREA
[Vol. 49:14971504
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majoritarian referendum or, say, whenever the national assembly
may happen to convene,2' nor so arduous that, as in the example of
our own original constitution (i.e., the Articles of Confederation22),
little if anything (other than mere trivial changes23 ) could be
proposed by way of amendment with any realistic expectation of
meeting the enactment requirements set forth in the Constitution
itself.
24
In this respect, it is probably the case that the U.S. model is
unduly stringent. In standardly25 requiring agreement by two-
MEASUREMENTS, AND DENSITY: 1790 TO 1990 (1990), http://www.census.gov/population/
censusdatatable-2.pdf. By itself, moreover, were it a nation, California's economy would rank
it well within the ten largest national economies of the world economies. See California
Legislative Analyst's Office, Cal Facts 2006 State Economy, http://www.lao.ca.gov/2006/
cal_facts/2006_calfactsecon.htm#economy (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). Within California,
moreover, provisions in the state constitution have been applied in its courts with significant
effect; for example, in California, state constitutional law is itself a considerable force. See,
e.g., Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L.
REV. 199, 202-04 (1998) (cataloguing California's robust independent constitutional
interpretation).
21. This is too close to the actual situation in The People's Republic of China, as well as
in India, in which alterations in the constitution need only be approved by two-thirds of the
national legislature in order to take effect. See XIAN FA art. 64 (1982) (P.R.C.); INDIA CONST.
art. 368, cl. 2: amended by the Constitution (Twenty-fourth Amendment) Act, 1971.
Particularly where a single political party readily holds two-thirds or more of the elected
national representatives, as in China, it becomes virtually as easy to alter the constitution
itself as to enact any merely ordinary law. For additional critical reflections on the rule of
law in China, see William W. Van Alstyne, Civil Rights and Civil Liberties: Whose "Rule of
Law'?, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 623 (2003).
22. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
23. See, for example, U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII, which is so utterly trivial that even few
lawyers will be able to identify it without looking it up-and of which scarcely anyone was
even aware when Congress declared it to be "valid ... as part of the Constitution," in May
1992. H.R. Con. Res. 319, 102d Cong. (1992). For a brief critical review, see William Van
Alstyne, What Do You Think About the Twenty-seventh Amendment?, 10 CONST. COMMENT.
9 (1993).
24. For a collection of differing perspectives on this challenging problem, see, for
example, RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL
AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995).
25. One says "standardly," advisably. More accurately, Article V also provides that
amendments may be proposed in a convention to be called by Congress on petition of two-
thirds of the states. U.S. CONST. art. V. This procedure, however, has never successfully been
invoked. See Ronald D. Rotunda & Stephen J. Safranell, An Essay on Term Limits and a Call
for Constitutional Convention, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 227, 228 (1996). Article V also permits
Congress to send proposed amendments to state ratification conventions (rather than to the
fifty state legislatures), if it wishes. U.S. CONST. art. V. This option, however, was actually
used only once (to bypass state legislatures in respect to the Twenty-first Amendment, to
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thirds majorities in both houses of Congress to propose an amend-
ment, plus resolutions of ratification by three-fourths of the fifty
state legislatures (all but one of which is bicameral),26 the provi-
sions thus set in place in Article V are exceedingly hard to fulfill.
Even taking proposals to amend-and thus actually to alter a
constitution's embedded provisions-as seriously as one ought, the
requirements of the amending article are worthy of some measured
skepticism. Indeed, they are substantially more stringent than will
be found in most other constitutions and probably unduly stringent
even for the United States itself."
III.
With characteristic assertiveness, Richard Epstein recently
offered the following dissent from a famous observation by a person
far more famous than even himself. "Churchill," he wrote, "was
wrong when he said democracy was the worst of all forms of
government, except the rest. Constitutional democracy will work
secure repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment).
26. In all states except Nebraska-the one unicameral legislature-the amendment must
win approval by a majority in each house, i.e, each considered separately from the other must
vote "aye;" otherwise, the proposed amendment fails. This commonplace feature obviously
magnifies the possibility of blocking proposed amendments, merely by effective lobbying in
either chamber, such as it is, regardless of statewide sentiment overall and the more than
adequate support reflected in the ample votes in the other house.
27. In my own view, the difficulty of securing amendments has had two related
deleterious effects. The first deleterious effect is that, precisely because the project of
securing any significant amendment is made so problematic, far more than originally,
incidentally, when there were but thirteen states and a need therefore to secure approval in
ten rather than as today in all of thirty-eight, the burden has seemingly fallen upon the
Supreme Court to compensate by engaging in "virtual amendment" by judicial fiat, i.e., by
exceedingly loose "interpretations" of existing articles and clauses. But precisely because the
Court does engage in this practice, many who might otherwise be willing to risk a vote to
approve a desirable and meaningful amendment to the Constitution may be hesitant to do
so. Having witnessed how loosely the Supreme Court has presumed in the past to construe
(or misconstrue) existing provisions already embedded in the Constitution, there is an added
wariness to vote for anything that may merely give the Court an additional lever to pull
whenever a mere majority of its members may be so inclined to pull it to produce results they
deem suitable to please themselves. The net effect is one of "negative synergy." For a more
elaborate discussion and review (as applied specifically to the failed Equal Rights
Amendment, which would have been the twenty-seventh amendment), see William Van
Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part I, Processes of Change, 1984 U. ILL. L.
REv. 933, 951-58.
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better."28 What Epstein meant by that, of course, was that un-
checked, democracy provides no security against whatever tides
of passion and prejudice the people (the "demos") decide.29
Constitutional democracy "works better," intelligently dividing
authority, integrating various checks and balances, setting
boundaries on what may (and may not) be done, when, by whom,
and under what circumstances-even while also providing a means
for each of these matters to be subject to reconsideration by
generations downstream. And doubtless, in some strong measure,
virtually all who spend their time in drafting or worrying over what
kind of constitution one ought to adopt, what ought to be included
within its provisions (and, oppositely, what ought not) must
surely agree with Epstein. Otherwise, it is hard to account for
the intensity of feeling, as well as of anxiety, that go into these
enterprises, or even to account for this modest symposium on
drafting constitutions in post-conflict states.
To be sure, under one view, it does not really matter what goes
into (or is left out of) a constitution. For example, if one agrees that
its main purpose is more by way of promotional advertising than
something more, then one will be less vexed than otherwise
respecting its particular provisions. Rather, understanding that the
constitution is not necessarily to be taken seriously as "hard"
law3 -- enforceable law-its provisions may be authored principally
with a concern for appearances, not for substance. And, in point of
fact, it is doubtless true that a number of constitutions are substan-
tially of just this sort.
How, then, does one tell the difference? We have already touched
on one sure telltale sign, namely, the relative (i.e., excessive) ease
of making alterations so that, insofar as certain clauses of the
constitution may prove to be a hindrance to what "the people"
(whether as allegedly represented in a national congress or by
literal plebescite) would apparently now prefer, it is scarcely more
difficult to make an alteration in the constitution than it is to enact
28. Richard Epstein, Zoning: Deliberative Democracy at Zero Prices, DAEDALUS, Summer
2007, at 67, 70 (emphasis added).
29. See id. at 68-70.
30. For an elaboration of this expression, see William W. Van Alstyne, The Idea of the
Constitution as Hard Law, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 174 (1987).
2008] 1507
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1497
any other law." But are there any other telltale signs? Most
assuredly there are. Among the most obvious are these:
(1) May--or may not-the constitution itself be appealed to
when it matters most, i.e., when the full force of (what other-
wise passes for) "the law" is brought down upon one (whether
it is "brought down upon" one in court 32 or out 33)?
(2) Assuming the constitution may be appealed to,34 are the
courts in which is lodged the authority and affirmative
obligation to hear one's constitutional objection (or constitu-
tional claim) not to take direction from some other authority
31. This is, of course, one easy way of coping with what Alexander Bickel wrote of so
perplexingly, in his famous book, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (2d ed. 1962), wherein he
coined the term "countermajoritarian difficulty" to describe his view that judicial review
stands in tension with democratic theory. See id. at 16. I admit even now, however, while
admiring Bickel enormously, of not grasping the problem as he presented it. For I had taken
it for granted (and still do) that, indeed, it is an essential function of a constitution (as law)
to be "countermajoritarian" in a meaningful sense of that term (i.e, to constrain it "against
itself" so to speak). If one finds the idea too distasteful, well and good, in which event it is
merely logical either to render its provisions "nonjusticiable" or, indeed, so susceptible of
ready amendment as on that account-the sheer ease of enacting changes-will readily
enable today's majority so to amend it and at once get on with its agenda, whatever that
might be.
32. This force may be brought down upon one "in court" when one is criminally
prosecuted or civilly sued, and whether the proceeding itself has been initiated by an arm of
the government or by some party other than the state itself.
33. It may be brought down upon one "out" of court when, indeed, one is not proceeded
against in any "court," rather, one is "proceeded against" in other ways and other places (for
example, as when one is merely arrested and, as it were, "simply detained," or as when one
is simply set upon and dispossessed, or as when one is merely turned away and left without
effective recourse to seek relief). The critical issue here is not the issue of the obligation of
courts as such; rather, the issue here is antecedent to that one, i.e., of meaningful access to
the courts. (It is just this issue that was most recently tested in the U.S. Supreme Court, for
example, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), and, even as this Article goes to
press, is once again critically before the Supreme Court, in Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981
(D.C. Cir. 2007), cert. granted, 127 S. Ct. 3078 (2007).)
34. This is itself a very large assumption, incidentally (indeed, a false assumption in
many countries with nominally strong constitutions, i.e., virtually "model" constitutions,
many of which read far more impressively than the understated Constitution of the United
States). Note, once again, that there are also two separate questions here: the first of which
is that of meaningful access to courts, and the second is that of the jurisdiction of courts in
terms of their authority and duty to determine constitutional questions additional to any
"nonconstitutional" questions on which the case might turn. In this latter respect, one means
to distinguish regimes that permit lots of cases "to be heard in court," but which
simultaneously reserve "constitutional" questions for other authorities to resolve (for
example, to be "resolved" by the highest political organ(s) of the state) and which neither
litigants nor courts may presume to draw into question.
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but, rather, to act on the question independently of what other
authorities say?1
5
(3) Do the constitution and laws enacted pursuant to the
constitution provide adequately to secure the integrity of the
courts? So, on the one hand, do they provide for a sufficiency of
tenure and of material support to enable the courts to do their
work? 6 Do they also, however, provide adequate means to
check the integrity of the judiciary itself?37
No doubt, putting to one side these familiar questions, in our
efforts to identify essential elements of "meaningful" constitutions,
there are a host of others one might believe to be worthy of at least
as much consideration as we have but very briefly given to
these-not merely other questions relating to the judiciary in
35. Herein arises a still separate question (i.e., not as to whether there is access to courts
and not whether it is inclusive of the right to raise constitutional questions and have them
ruled upon by the court). Rather, it is the still separate question of "independent" judicial
review. The question was resolved early on in the United States by Chief Justice Marshall,
writing for a unanimous Court in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)
(concluding that the judicial oath clause of Article VI obliges judges to make an independent
assessment of whether an act of Congress is authorized by the Constitution-i.e.,
independent of Congress and equally independent of whatever may have been asserted by
the President in signing it into law). Stated differently, the proposition is this: the courts are
not to "defer" to the views of the coequal departments of government in deciding
constitutional questions, and they are to decline to apply or enforce any law for which they
can find no warrant in the Constitution as it now stands.
36. So, for example, in the United States, the salient provisions in Article III entrench
all federal judges with lifetime tenure, (i.e., no limited term of years can be set by
Congress-whether in respect to those appointed to the Supreme Court or to the lower
federal courts), and no legislation reducing their compensation during that tenure may be
enacted to take effect during their service. See U.S. CONST. art III, § 1. (This is not to say,
however, that there may not be other ways to affect them greatly, such as "starving" the
judiciary budget itself, or by adding new justices to serve (thus to dilute the effect of votes
of current members of the Court), or altering the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
or contracting the jurisdiction of the lower courts, quite apart from the power in the House
to impeach for "treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors," and to try, convict,
and remove in the Senate, a power never successfully employed, however, in respect to
justices on the Supreme Court itself. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; id. art. II, § 4; id. art.
I, § 3, cl. 6.) In respect to the "tenure-for-life" feature of Article III (rather than merely a
generous limited term provision, say, of eighteen years), incidentally, the United States is
evidently alone, as knowledgeable critics have been quick to observe. See Steven G. Calabresi
& James Lindgren, Term Limits for the Supreme Court: Life Tenure Reconsidered, in
REFORMING THE COURT: TERM LIMITS FOR SUPREME COURT JUSTICES 44-46 (Roger C.
Cramton & Paul D. Carrington eds., 2006).
37. See supra note 36.
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particular (i.e., "other questions" addressed to such important
matters as the process by which the judges are selected, or by whom
selected or appointed, and on whose advice or consent3 ), but
questions relating to other departments and other government
personnel.39 Even so, even as in the instance of a child asked to
spell "banana" (or maybe 'Mississippi"?), one must be prepared to
show some discipline in knowing when to stop rather than to
continue simply to run on. I think we are roughly at that point,
indeed, if not already past it, so I mean now quickly to conclude.
IV.
Written constitutions are now virtually a dime a dozen, and most
certainly much more common than in previous epochs, in the long
history of national states. Indeed, as noted in a very early
footnote,4 ° it is rare that any nation today lacks some inscribed
template of a constitutional sort. Thus our foray, our quest, has
been that of attempting merely to sort through different varieties
of written constitutions such as they are, looking to try to identify
elements that would seem to make some of them more meaningful
than others-including some among the latter which, though they
38. Note, for example, that nothing in the U.S. Constitution determines how state court
judges are to be selected (or elected), though doubtless it is in the state courts (rather than
the federal courts) that by far the greater number of constitutional issues are adjudicated,
with but a tiny fraction thereafter becoming subject to reexamination in the Supreme Court
(or, indeed, for that matter, in many instances, in any federal court). In states submitting
judges to ordinary election processes, judicial tenure can be highly unstable, more or less
submitting the determination of the acceptability of the judges' decisions to populist review.
(For a recent Supreme Court decision sharply illuminating this issue, see Republican Party
of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002).)
39. To illustrate this latter point with but a single example, does either the Constitution
itself-or suitable legislation enacted pursuant to its provisions-provide any effective
measure of "whistle-blower" protection? Or, to the contrary, does the regime of law provide
no modicum of security for those who decline to accept an ongoing clandestine
unconstitutional practice, regardless of how egregious, regardless of how persistent, and
regardless of by whom or at what level of government it is being pursued? The presence (and
so, too, the absence), of constitutional and/or of statutory measures suitably addressed to the
dark abyss of internal state practices may itself tell us as much as anything else about the
real "meaningfulness" (or meaninglessness) of a constitution, whether it is our own or that
of some far more recent "post-conflict" state.
40. See supra note 11 (identifying Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom, as
exceptions to the general rule).
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read quite impressively, turn out to be inscribed on mere wet
cardboard (indeed, turn out to be a promise made to the ear and
broken in the heart).
Is that quest worthwhile? I think it is, but one needs also to be
cautious in one's confidence, diffident in one's thinking, and sobered
by observations such as these by Learned Hand, deservedly among
the most justly admired American judges, serving on the federal
court from the time of the First World War itself through the
Second and beyond:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes;
believe me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of
men and women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no
court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do
much to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no
law, no court to save it.4 1
Doubtless, in some larger sense, Judge Hand was, and is, right.
To the extent that he is, perhaps the answer to the question raised
in the very title to this brief Article, i.e., how does one distinguish
the "quintessential" elements of meaningful constitutions (from
those we merely regard as "essential"), is not to be found anywhere
within even the most perfectly drafted constitution, including our
own (for which I certainly make no claim of "perfect-as-is"). Those
elements, i.e., the quintessential ones, if to be found at all, even as
Learned Hand suggested, lie outside the document, outside the
courts, elsewhere-somehow within a general spirit of moderation,
altruism, tolerance, and resolve. Lacking those elements, a society
will not sustain itself nor may the best possible constitution have
any sufficient effect.
Yet, though that be true, I would close not with Judge Hand as
the last word, but instead with these remarks offered by Thomas
Jefferson, commenting in a letter to James Madison, on how he
believed the enactment of the Bill of Rights into our Constitution
was a useful thing to do. "A brace the more will often keep up the
building which would have fallen, with that brace the less,"
41. LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 144 (Irving Dilliard ed., 1959).
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Jefferson observed.42 So, here as well. The endeavor of struggling
nations to instantiate meaningful constitutions, is not to be
slighted. Rather, it is to be encouraged and aided, as best we can
aspire to do.
42. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (Mar. 15, 1789), in THE LIFE AND
SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Adrienne Koch & William Peden eds., Modern
Library Paperback ed. 1998) (1944).
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